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15.04.2020
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For the past 26 months, Intel and other CPU makers have been assailed by Spectre, Meltdown, and a steady flow of follow-on vulnerabilities that make it possible for attackers to pluck passwords, encryption keys, and other sensitive data out of computer memory. On Tuesday, researchers disclosed a new flaw that steals information from Intel’s SGX, short for Software Guard eXtensions, which acts as a digital vault for securing users' most sensitive secrets.

  1. Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) Selecting the Owner EPOCH input type. The Intel drivers use the seed to create a key to lock the secure memory enclave. The system ships with a default seed. Change this number at startup to secure your memory. Optional: To have the system generate a.
  2. Mar 10, 2020 Intel SGX is vulnerable to an unfixable flaw that can steal crypto keys and more Just when you thought it was secure again, Intel's digital vault falls to a new attack.
  3. After having all the libraries ready to run within SGX, it was necessary to move all the random generation inside the enclave so the toxic waste is protected and not even whoever executes it can.

SGX Secure Enclaves in Practice: Security and Crypto Review JPAumasson,LuisMerino—KudelskiSecurity. Random Generation in SGX. SGX Secure Enclaves in Practice: Security and Crypto Review Author: JP Aumasson, Luis Merino — Kudelski Security.

On the surface, Load Value Injection, as researchers have named their proof-of-concept attacks, works in ways similar to the previous vulnerabilities and accomplishes the same thing. All of these so-called transient-execution flaws stem from speculative execution, an optimization in which CPUs attempt to guess future instructions before they're called. Meltdown and Spectre were the first transient execution exploits to become public. Attacks named ZombieLoad, RIDL, Fallout, and Foreshadow soon followed. Foreshadow also worked against Intel’s SGX.

Breaking the vault

By getting a vulnerable system to run either JavaScript stored on a malicious site or code buried in a malicious app, attackers can exploit a side channel that ultimately discloses cache contents belonging to other apps that should normally be off-limits. This latest vulnerability, which like other transient-execution flaws can only be mitigated and not patched, gives way to exploits that completely upend a core confidentiality guarantee of SGX.

Load Value Injection, or LVI for short, is especially important because the exploit allows for the raiding of secrets stored in the SGX enclave, the name often used for Intel’s Software Guard eXtensions. Apps that work with encryption keys, passwords, digital rights management technology, and other secret data often use SGX to run in a fortified container known as a trusted execution environment. LVI can also steal secrets out of other regions of a vulnerable CPU.

Released in 2015, SGX also creates isolated environments inside memory called enclaves. SGX uses strong encryption and hardware-level isolation to ensure the confidentiality of data and code and to prevent them from being tampered with. Intel designed SGX to protect apps and code even when the operating system, hypervisor, or BIOS firmware is compromised.

In the video below, researchers who discovered LVI show how an exploit can steal a secret encryption key protected by the SGX.

Intel has a list of affected processors here. Chips that have hardware fixes for Meltdown aren’t vulnerable. Exploitation may also be hindered by some defensive measures built into hardware or software that protect against null pointer dereference bugs. Some Linux distributions, for instance, don’t allow the mapping of a virtual address zero in user space. Another mitigation example: recent x86 SMAP and SMEP architectural features further prohibit user-space data and code pointer dereferences respectively in kernel mode. “SMAP and SMEP have been shown to also hold in the microarchitectural transient domain,” the researchers said.

Poisoning the processor

As its name suggests, LVI works by injecting attacker data into a running program and stealing sensitive data and keys it’s using at the time of the attack. The malicious data flows through hidden processor buffers into the program and hijacks the execution flow of an application or process. With that, the attacker’s code can acquire the sensitive information. It’s not possible to fix or mitigate the vulnerability inside the silicon, leaving the only mitigation option for outside developers to recompile the code their apps use. The team of researchers who devised the LVI exploit said that compiler mitigations come with a considerable hit to system performance.

“Crucially, LVI is much harder to mitigate than previous attacks, as it can affect virtually any access to memory,” the researchers wrote in an overview of their research. “Unlike all previous Meltdown-type attacks, LVI cannot be transparently mitigated in existing processors and necessitates expensive software patches, which may slow down Intel SGX enclave computations 2 up to 19 times.”

LVI reverses the exploitation process of Meltdown. Whereas Meltdown relies on an attacker probing memory offsets to infer the contents of in-flight data, LVI turns the flow around by injecting data that poisons hidden processor buffer (specifically the line fill buffer) with attacker values. From there, the attacker can hijack a process and access the data it uses.

LVI-based attacks aren’t likely to be used against consumer machines, because the attacks are extremely difficult to carry out and there are generally much easier ways to obtain confidential information in home and small business settings. The most likely attack scenario is a cloud-computing environment that allocates two or more customers to the same CPU. While hypervisors and other protections normally cordon off data belonging to different customers, LVI could in theory pluck out any data or code stored in SGX environments, as well as other regions of a vulnerable CPU.

In a statement, Intel officials wrote:

Researchers have identified a new mechanism referred to as Load Value Injection (LVI). Due to the numerous complex requirements that must be satisfied to successfully carry out, Intel does not believe LVI is a practical method in real world environments where the OS and VMM are trusted. Serial key generator 4.1. New mitigation guidance and tools for LVI are available now and work in conjunction with previously released mitigations to substantively reduce the overall attack surface. We thank the researchers who worked with us, and our industry partners for their contributions on the coordinated disclosure of this issue.

To mitigate the potential exploits of Load Value Injection (LVI) on platforms and applications utilizing Intel SGX, Intel is releasing updates to the SGX Platform Software and SDK starting today. The Intel SGX SDK includes guidance on how to mitigate LVI for Intel SGX application developers. Intel has likewise worked with our industry partners to make application compiler options available and will conduct an SGX TCB Recovery.

The chipmaker has published this deep dive.

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LVI primarily works against Intel CPUs, but it also affects other chips that are vulnerable to meltdown. Non-Intel CPUs that have been shown to be vulnerable to Meltdown include those based on the ARM design. It’s not currently known what specific ARM chips are affected.

The team that first identified the LVI vulnerabilities included researchers from imec-DistriNet, KU Leuven, Worcester Polytechnic Institute, Graz University of Technology, the University of Michigan, the University of Adelaide, and Data61. Researchers from Romanian security firm Bitdefender later discovered the vulnerability after the earlier team had already reported it to Intel. The first team has published information here. Bitdefender has details here, here, and here. Proof-of concept code is here and here.

Some restrictions apply

The difficulty in carrying out LVI attacks isn’t the only limitation. The data the attacks can acquire is also restricted to that stored at the time the malicious code is executed. That makes exploits either a game of luck or further adds to the rigorous requirements for exploitation. For those reasons, many researchers say they’re unsure exploits will ever be used in active malicious attacks.

Not all researchers share that assessment. Bogdan Botezatu, senior e-threat analyst at Bitdefender, said that the growing body of research showing how to exploit speculative execution may pave the way for use by real-world attackers, particularly those from nation-states targeting specific people.

Sgx Generate Random Key Enclave 2017

“There are more people involved in this kind of research who are good guys,” Botezatu told me. “Chances are the bad guys are also actively looking into the CPU issue. Which makes me think that, at some point, with enough scrutiny, this will not be solely an academic topic. It will become a viable tool to exploit in the wild.”

Create an extra layer of security for your private keys.

Overview

Keeping a private key in a keychain is a great way to secure it. The key data is encrypted on disk and accessible only to your app or the apps you authorize. However, to use the key, you must briefly copy a plain-text version of it into system memory. While this presents a reasonably small attack surface, there’s still the chance that if your app is compromised, the key could also become compromised. As an added layer of protection, you can store a private key in the Secure Enclave.

The Secure Enclave is a hardware-based key manager that’s isolated from the main processor to provide an extra layer of security. When you store a private key in the Secure Enclave, you never actually handle the key, making it difficult for the key to become compromised. Instead, you instruct the Secure Enclave to create the key, securely store it, and perform operations with it. You receive only the output of these operations, such as encrypted data or a cryptographic signature verification outcome.

The benefits of the Secure Enclave are balanced against a few restrictions. In particular, the Secure Enclave:

  • Is a hardware feature of the Apple A7 or later A-series processor. Only iOS devices with one of these processors or a MacBook Pro with the Touch Bar and Touch ID support this feature.

  • Stores only 256-bit elliptic curve private keys. These keys can only be used for creating and verifying cryptographic signatures, or for elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange (and by extension, symmetric encryption).

  • Can’t import preexisting keys. You must create keys directly inside the Secure Enclave. Not having a mechanism to transfer key data into or out of the Secure Enclave is fundamental to its security.

The steps required to create a private key in the Secure Enclave (and its corresponding public key outside the Secure Enclave) are similar to those for creating a key pair in the usual way, as described in Generating New Cryptographic Keys. The following sections highlight the differences.

Specify Access Control

You start by using an attribute dictionary to describe the key, but in this case, one of the attributes is an access control object. Use SecAccessControlCreateWithFlags(_:_:_:_:) to create a suitable object:

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This particular object includes a protection parameter of kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly. As a result, the associated keychain item is only accessible on the device that created it (a feature that’s also inherent to using the Secure Enclave), and only when the device is unlocked. Other less restrictive options are possible, but this option is generally preferred unless your app operates in the background.

A critical aspect of this access control object is its privateKeyUsage flag. This flag indicates that the private key should be available for use in signing and verification operations inside the Secure Enclave. Without the flag, key generation still succeeds, but signing operations that attempt to use it fail.

You could also combine the privateKeyUsage flag with other flags, using a bitwise OR to obtain additional protection for your key. For example, if you include the touchIDAny flag, you instruct the system to make the key available only when the system can authenticate the user with Touch ID (or a fallback passcode). See SecAccessControlCreateFlags for the complete list of available flags.

Assemble the Attributes

Using the access control object, you then create an attribute dictionary:

The attribute dictionary above is structurally similar to the one described in Creating an Asymmetric Key Pair. In particular, it indicates that the private key should be stored in the keychain and tagged for later retrieval. However, it differs in a few critical ways:

  • A new attribute, kSecAttrTokenID, with the value kSecAttrTokenIDSecureEnclave, indicates that the generation operation should take place inside the Secure Enclave.

  • The type and size attributes reflect that Secure Enclave only stores 256-bit elliptic curve keys.

  • The private key attribute dictionary includes the access control object generated in the previous step to indicate how the key can be used.

Create A Key Pair

With the attributes dictionary in hand, you create the key pair just as you do outside the Secure Enclave, with a call to the SecKeyCreateRandomKey(_:_:) function:

Notice that you still receive a reference to the private key object, even though it’s stored in the Secure Enclave. The private key is logically part of the keychain, and you can later obtain a reference to it in the usual way. But because its backing storage is physically part of the Secure Enclave, you can never inspect the key’s data.

Use the Secured Key

In most respects, key management proceeds as usual. You rely on the SecKeyCopyPublicKey(_:) function to obtain the public key from the private key, as described in Getting an Existing Key. You handle and release errors in the usual way. And while Swift manages the memory for you, in Objective-C, after you’re done with any generated items, you release their memory:

Sgx Generate Random Key Enclave Key

When you want to retrieve the key, you do it in the usual way, as described in Storing Keys in the Keychain. You also use the key to sign a block of code exactly as you would normally, as described in Signing and Verifying. Alternatively, you can use the key for encryption, as described in Using Keys for Encryption and in particular, for symmetric encryption using the eciesEncryptionCofactorX963SHA256AESGCM algorithm. Note that in these cases, you’re restricted to the elliptic curve algorithms because the Secure Enclave holds only elliptic curve keys.

See Also

Generating New Cryptographic Keys

Create both asymmetric and symmetric cryptographic keys.

func SecKeyCreateRandomKey(CFDictionary, UnsafeMutablePointer<Unmanaged<CFError>?>?) -> SecKey?

Sgx Generate Random Key Enclaves

func SecKeyCopyPublicKey(SecKey) -> SecKey?

Sgx Generate Random Key Enclave Key

Gets the public key associated with the given private key.

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Key Generation Attributes

Use attribute dictionary keys during cryptographic key generation.